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Abstract We present an analysis of the economic, political
and social factors that underlay the Apollo program, one of
the most exceptional and costly projects ever undertaken
by the United States in peacetime that culminated in 1969
with the first human steps on the Moon. This study suggests
that the Apollo program provides a vivid illustration of a
societal bubble, defined as a collective over-enthusiasm as
well as unreasonable investments and efforts, derived through
excessive public and/or political expectations of positive
outcomes associated with a general reduction of risk aversion.
We show that economic, political and social factors weaved a
network of reinforcing feedbacks that led to widespread over-
enthusiasm and extraordinary commitment by those involved
in the project as well as by politicians and by the public at
large. We propose the general concept of “pro-bubbles”,
according to which bubbles are an unavoidable development
in technological and social enterprise that benefits society by
allowing exceptional niches of innovation to be explored.
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In finance and economics, the term “bubble” refers to a
situation in which excessive public expectations of future
price increases cause prices to be temporarily elevated without
justification from fundamental valuation. Thus, bubbles
occurring in an economic context are seen as optimistic
predictions about the future that prove wrong. In this respect,
they are considered to be bad. Their ominous character is
amplified by the uncertainty stemming from the lack of a
consensus on their causes, which make them a major
challenge to economic theory. Numerous books and scholarly
works attempt to dissect the developments, origins and wealth
destructions associatedwith financial bubbles; see for instance
the celebrated book on the great 1929 crash by J. K. Galbraith
(1997), The Great Crash, 1929, Boston: HoughtonMifflin and
the book by R. J. Shiller (2000), Irrational Exuberance,
Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, made famous by
its timely publication a few months before the ICT bubble
crash in 2000. Financial bubbles are also of great concern to
central banks and regulatory agencies as they may signal and/
or cause systemic instabilities.
In the present essay, we build on the somewhat
antagonistic hypothesis proposed recently by one of the
authors (D. Sornette (2008), “Nurturing Breakthroughs:
Lessons from Complexity Theory,” Journal of Economic
Interaction and Coordination, December 2008) that bub-
bles constitute an essential element in the maturation
process and in the dynamics leading to great innovations
or discoveries. Moreover, we contend that bubbles seem to
be an unavoidable development in technological and social
enterprise that benefits society by allowing exceptional
niches of innovation to be explored. During bubbles, people
take inordinate risks that would not otherwise be justified
by standard cost-benefit and portfolio analysis. Bubbles are
characterized by collective over-enthusiasm as well as
unreasonable investments and efforts, derived through
excessive public and/or political expectations of positive
outcomes. Only during these times do people dare explore
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new opportunities, many of them unreasonable and hope-
less, with rare emergences of lucky achievements. Sornette
proposed this mechanism as the leading one controlling the
appearance of disruptive innovations and major advances.
Bubbles, defined as collective over-enthusiasm, seem a
necessary (and unavoidable) evil to foster our collective
attitude towards risk taking and break the stalemate of
society resulting from its tendency towards stronger risk
avoidance. An absence of bubble psychology would lead to
stagnation and conservatism as no large risks are taken and,
as a consequence, no large return can be accrued. We refer
to this concept as the “pro-bubble hypothesis”. The concept
of the “new economy”, a term used during the 1920s (the
utility bubble), the 1960s (the “tronic” boom) and the 1990s
(the Internet and Communication Technology bubble),
captures vividly this mindset held by the large majority of
investors and firm managers at times of bubbles: there is
widespread belief that times have changed irreversibly and
for the better, and that a new epoch, a new economy, a new
prosperity without business cycles and recessions, is the
novel emergent rule with the expectation of endless profits.
Our goal is to explore and test the evidence that bubbles
lead to a lot of destruction of value but also to the
exploration and discovery of exceptional niches. Our pro-
bubble hypothesis is related to and extends a few previous
works in the literature. In her book on Technological
Revolutions and Financial Capital (2002), Carlota Perez
uses the term bubbles to describe the financial processes
characterized by the installation of a new paradigm (or
“revolution”) and its concentration of investment in the
respective new (scientific) enterprise (infrastructure, human
resources, etc.). Her analysis suggests that the working of
markets cannot by itself explain the recurrence of major
crashes and depressions. Instead, the emergence of these
phenomena need to be explained by the analysis of the
tensions, resistance, obstacles and misalignments that arise
from within the wider social and institutional scene. In a
forthcoming paper (The special Nature and consequences
of major technology bubbles, 2008), Perez develops further
this argument by showing that the establishment of all
major infrastructures associated with dominant techno-
economic paradigms has been intimately linked to major
technological bubbles, entailing the euphoric and reckless
build-up of overcapacities of various kinds.
Others suggest that cognitive biases may lead to
collective social gains such as the collective value of
overconfidence that often drives individual entrepreneurial
decisions. Collective boom and bust behaviors drive private
investors to develop externalities and collective physical
infrastructures that no sober exclusively profit-motivated
actor would have done otherwise. Columnist Daniel Gross,
in his 2007 book on Why Bubbles Are Great For The
Economy, develops a similar argument. He takes a
counterintuitive look at economic bubbles—those once-in-
a-generation crazes that everyone knows can’t last, and
don’t. Common thinking states that excessive investment in
fixed assets is bad for investors, for the employees of the
bubble companies, and for the economy. Gross surveys
historical and modern bubbles and describes evidence for
the benefits to be far more durable than the disruptions: in
each case, most investors flopped, but businesses and
consumers found themselves with a usable commercial
infrastructure. He contends that the outcomes built during
infrastructure bubbles do not get plowed under when their
owners go bankrupt; on the contrary, they’re getting reused
later by those with new business plans, lower cost bases,
and better capital structures. In fact, what is likely to be a
catastrophe from one point of view, others, such as the
above mentioned Perez and Gross, see a collective social
gain stemming from bubble behavior (major investments
with low returns) on the long run. Innovation processes and
the creation of new technology seem inherently associated
with bubbles. These authors suggest that crashes/crises/
busts are unavoidable epochs covering about 10% of the
time, but on the other hand they provide benefit for the
remaining 90% of the time.
Essentially, our pro-bubble hypothesis extends these
previous works by emphasizing the dynamical role played
by bubbles in reducing collective risk aversion that occur
during the innovation and discovery processes. Over-
optimistic expectations lead people to focus almost solely
on the returns and to forget the risks. Returns are
understood here not only as financial profits, but also as
individual and/or social gains. The main questions resulting
from this hypothesis are: What factors (economically,
politically, socially) have been crucial in the discussed
processes? What risks were undertaken and within which
frame (temporal, cultural), by whom (individuals as well as
institutions), and how? Which are the investments, what are
the nature and level of efforts?
In order to learn from historical analysis and contribute
to contemporary strategic and policy thinking, the scientific
program suggested by the pro-bubble hypothesis is to
identify the building of bubbles in scientific/social environ-
ments in different periods, to analyze their alleged
collapse and to identify the socio-economic processes
taking place in the aftermath. Sornette suggested five
examples illustrating the pro-bubble hypothesis: the great
boom of railway shares in Britain in the 1840s, the Apollo
program of the United States, the Human Genome project,
the closing of mammals (Dolly, the sheep), and the ITC
bubble culminating in 2000. Here, we study in depth one of
them, the United States Apollo program, as it represents
arguably one of the most striking modern examples of a
fundamental innovation process. The program was
launched in 1961 by then President J.F. Kennedy, being
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fulfilled by the Apollo 11 lunar landing in 1969, and
concluded with Apollo 17 in 1972. Our attention is on the
question of the undivided willingness to take large risks that
give way to major innovations.
The United States Apollo Program in Historical
Perspective
The Apollo program was one of the most ambitious and
costly single project ever undertaken by the United States in
peacetime. One of the main foci of scholars studying the
Apollo program has been from the perspective of the space
race between the United States and the USSR in the context
of the cold war. The cold war and the space race were
indeed important factors in the formation of the Apollo
program; however, we argue that there were other equally
important and perhaps even more important factors at play.
Support for this hypothesis can be found in the fact that the
Cold War did not end with the termination of the Apollo
project; neither did collaboration between the US and the
USSR start after the collapse of the latter in 1989, on the
contrary, the SOYUS project started as early as 1967. Or, as
John Logdson has emphasized, it was “[…] global space
leadership that was the basic goal, with U.S.-Soviet space
relations an important, but not the only, venue for achieving
that leadership.” (Logsdon in Dick and Launius ed. 2007:
90). Eisenhower’s policy was to deny the existence of a
space race between the United States and the USSR, and
Kennedy first continued this policy by proposing to the
Soviets to collaborate in space exploration (see the
contributions in Dick and Launius ed. 2007).
Our interest therefore focuses on the internal perspec-
tives that played a role in the development of the Apollo
program. It is important to note that the Apollo program
enjoyed high visibility and strong interest from a large
fraction of the population, including its financial and
technical components. We argue that the Apollo program
developed as a bubble, first nucleated and engineered by a
special interest group, which inflated to a very large size
only through the general positive feedback mechanisms
discussed in the introduction that are usually associated
with bubbles. One characteristic feature of a bubble is
overinvestment (with respect to standard cost-benefit
calculations) into new technologies and sciences. Here,
we understand the phenomenon of overinvestment as
occurring not only in the financial sphere, but also in the
working commitments and loads that people were ready to
undertake, the personal engagement for new ideas, the
power of leadership that attracted potential sponsors as well
as the public. We call this process an exogenous critical
bubble (see also Sornette 2005, e-print http://arxiv.org/abs/
physics/0412026), the term exogenous emphasizing that the
process was engineered, and the word critical stressing the
fact that after some encouragement the program flew by its
own in the public mind, leading to explore uncharted
territories independent of the expected results. Indeed, as
we recall below (and as is well-known), the Apollo
program enjoyed a tremendous support, financially as well
as societal. Yet, it ended rather abruptly. Looking from a
different angle, we will show though that the ending was
not as unexpected as it seemed to have been, when viewed
from the perspective offered by the pro-bubble hypothesis.
In 1958, Wernher von Braun (1912–1977), one of the
most important rocket scientists and defenders of space
exploration during the period between the 1930s and the
1970s, announced the plan to land on the Moon within a
decade. On May 25, 1961, John F. Kennedy, who had
succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower as the US-President a
few months before, challenged his nation to land a man on
the Moon before the decade was out (“... this nation should
commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is
out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely
to the Earth.”) (Congressional Record (25 May 1961) vol.
107, pt. 7: 8881. http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/art/
artifact/Painting_35_00001.htm [URL: April 30, 2008]).
On April 24, at a meeting of the Space Exploration
Program council, Vice President Lyndon Johnson further-
more asked: “We’ve got a terribly important decision to
make. Shall we put a man on the Moon?” Everybody
agreed. By July 20, with hardly a dissenting vote, Congress
authorized a space budget 60% higher than Eisenhower’s
January request (Fortune, November 1963 issue). And in
fact—as we all know—, on July 16, 1969, the spacecraft
Apollo 11 took off from Cape Kennedy (now Cape
Canaveral) in Florida, sending three American astronauts
into space. Three days later, Neil Armstrong (1930–)
stepped off the missile and walked on the Moon’s surface,
his colleague Edwin E. Aldrin Jr. (1930–) to follow 18 min
later. Project Apollo (at that time under the presidency of
Richard Nixon), which had been born out of the Mercury
Project that successfully sent manned capsules into orbit,
proved to be one of the most successful endeavors in the
history of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) (http://www.astronautix.com/project/apollo.
htm).
Answering von Braun’s dreams and President Kennedy’s
challenge of landing men on the Moon by 1969, the Apollo
program was launched, America’s premier space effort
during the 1960’s, and the centerpiece of America’s
manned space effort (http://www.nasa.gov/topics/history/
index.html [URL: April 30, 2008]). It was considered a
highly important project for its focus on innovation and the
requirement of the most sudden burst of technological
creativity, enormous human efforts and expenditures, and
the largest commitment of resources (estimated variously
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between roughly 21.8 and 25 billion United States Dollars
(USD)—1960s value). In comparison, the Manhatten
Project, established during World War II for the develop-
ment and construction of the Atomic Bomb, required 2
billion USD. At its peak, the Apollo program employed
400,000 people, and required the support of hundreds of
universities and 20,000 distinct industrial companies (Ertel
and Morse 1969–1978). Enthusiasm was high in terms of
funding as well as in terms of human effort. Its objective
was twofold and its expectation high: the immediate goal,
as proclaimed by President John F. Kennedy before
Congress in 1961, was to land men on the Moon. A second
and far broader objective was to make the United States
preeminent in space, taking a leading role in space
achievement and ensuring that the nation would be second
to none in its ability to explore the expected riches of the
solar system and beyond.
What made the people involved take risks to put
machines and men in space? Three points are to be
addressed: First, the development of science and technol-
ogy was at the vanguard of these endeavors, fueled by
scientific curiosity and ambition on the part of the
scientists. Second, political reasons were equally strong:
the US and the USSR were competing for military
superiority as well as for dominance in space, the cold
war was building up strongly. On October 4, 1957, the
Soviet Union had successfully launched Sputnik I. The U.S.
Defense Department responded to the political furor by
approving funding for another U.S. satellite project. As a
simultaneous alternative to Vanguard, one of the most
important protagonists of the early space program, Wernher
von Braun and his team began to work on the Explorer,
later on the Saturn I project. After that, a state of affairs was
launched what nowadays is referred to as the “space race.”
It involved the efforts to explore outer space with artificial
satellites, to send humans into space, and to land people on
the Moon. And third, space technology became a particu-
larly important arena in this race. Space research had a dual
purpose: it could serve peaceful ends, demonstrating a
country’s scientific competence but could also contribute to
military goals.
Political and Financial Support for the Apollo Program
The Apollo program was originally conceived early in
1960, during the Eisenhower administration, as a follow-up
to America’s Mercury program. The goal was to develop
the basic technology for manned spaceflight and investigate
human’s ability to survive and perform in space. While the
Mercury capsule could only support one astronaut on a
limited Earth orbital mission, the Apollo spacecraft was
intended to be able to carry three astronauts on a
circumlunar flight and perhaps even on a lunar landing.
While NASAwent ahead with planning for Apollo, funding
for the program was far from certain, particularly given
Eisenhower’s equivocal attitude to manned spaceflight. To
answer concerns that the Americans were losing the lead,
Eisenhower decided to create a civil establishment dedicat-
ed to space research, feeling that spending on space
exploration could be seriously defended only in both
military and scientific terms. On 29 July 1958, the creation
of an American space agency, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, NASA, was approved. “Space
exploration holds the promise of adding importantly to
our knowledge of the Earth, the solar system and the
universe”, claimed Eisenhower (D. Eisenhower cited in
Cadbury, 2005: 187). More importantly, as a civilian
agency, NASA would avoid service rivalries and satisfy
political demand for peaceful uses of space (Launius and
McCurdy ed. 1997).
In November 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected
President. As a senator running for president, he had
argued in a questionnaire of the journal Missiles and
Rockets. The Missile Space Weekly (October 10 issue) that
the United States were in a strategic space race with the
Russians, and, what’s more, that the Americans were
allegedly losing this race. It is with Kennedy then that the
idea of space race against the Russians took its incipiency.
Using space exploration as a symbol of national prestige,
Kennedy initially warned of a missile gap between the two
nations, pledging to make the United States the first nation
in space. And it paid its tribute: In his autobiography,
astronaut Michael Collins (Carrying the fire—an astronaut’s
journeys, 1974) retrospectively expressed his concerns for
the years 1962 and again 1965, the Russians being ahead in
terms of space technology. By April 1963, however,
Kennedy considered to justify the Apollo program in terms
other than cold war prestige.
His maneuvering between personal belief and public
statements was more than sheer rhetoric: Kennedy did not
immediately come to a decision on the status of the Apollo
program once he was elected President. He not only knew
little about the technical details of the space program,
what’s more, he was put off by the massive financial
commitment required by a manned Moon landing. Despite
public support, Kennedy had expressed concerns about the
program and the funds that it absorbed. When NASA
Administrator James Webb requested a 30% budget
increase for his agency, Kennedy supported an acceleration
of NASA’s large booster program but yet deferred a
decision on the broader issue. His plans were abruptly
changed by two unexpected events in mid April 1961: The
first man in Earth orbit by the soviets (Yuri Gagarin) and
the CIA-backed Cuban exiles invasion failure at the Bay of
Pigs. In late May 1961, his budget director had warned
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Kennedy of the large price tag of Apollo and, when he
met Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna the following month,
Kennedy suggested that the United States and the Soviet
Union explored the Moon as a joint project. The Soviet
leader requested disarmament as a prerequisite for the US-
USSR cooperation in space. In September 1963, Kennedy
met with James Webb and told him to prepare for a joint
program. On September 20, 1963, Kennedy gave his well-
known speech before the United Nations General Assembly,
in which he again proposed a joint human mission to the
Moon. Publicly though, the Soviet Union was noncommittal.
Kennedy, as a result, seized on Apollo as the ideal focus for
American efforts in space. He ensured continuing funding,
shielding space spending from the 1963 tax cut and diverting
money from other NASA projects. In the public, beside
politics, Kennedy needed a different message to gain
support. Even more so after Khrushchev dissociated his
country from the space race (see the contributions in Launius
and McCurdy ed. 1997; Dick and Launius ed. 2007).
Kennedy’s reluctance was also fueled by another
apprehension: In 1961, he expressed great concern about
the people involved: “We are, I hope, going to be able to
carry out our efforts with due regard to the problem of the
life of the men involved this year.” (J. F. Kennedy cited in
Dick and Cowing ed. 2004: 259). Even though he did not
say it directly, he was referring to the risk of putting
humans into space. James Webb, then NASA Administrator
and the person who had most to gain from the tremendous
expansions of budget and power, was the last to climb
aboard for the Moon. He issued a statement equally
hesitantly: “We must keep the perspective that each flight
is but one of many milestones we must pass. Some will
completely succeed in every respect. Some partially, and
some will fail.” (J. Webb cited in ibd.: 259). The reward for
the United States when people were willing to take risks
and to explore through manned space flight was obvious to
Kennedy; it was the public he had to convince of it.
Later in 1963, Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to
investigate the possible technological and scientific benefits
of a Moon mission (see the Memorandum for Vice
President of April 20, 1961, in Launius 2004). Johnson
had no time for caution. He concluded that the benefits
were limited but, with the help of scientists at NASA (and
Webb had already assured him that a Moon landing was
technically possible), he put together a powerful case, citing
possible medical breakthroughs and interesting pictures of
Earth from space. By emphasizing the scientific payoff and
playing on fears of Soviet space dominance, Kennedy and
Johnson managed to swing public opinion. The technology
base that Apollo would enhance, so was the saying, was
worth the risk—financially and personally. And the
argument caught on (an example is given in Dick and
Cowing ed. 2004).
Even more so, after the assassination of Kennedy:
Johnson and Webb constantly defended the Apollo program
as the wish of this slain president. That was a very powerful
argument to be made in the political arena and they
achieved success in protecting the program, even as
everything else at NASA began to suffer budget cuts from
the mid-1960s onward (Launius in Dick and Launius ed.
2007). After Johnson became President in 1963, his
continuing defense of the program allowed it to succeed
in 1969.
It was as Vice President though that Johnson entered the
scene of the space program, going beyond what a Vice
president normally did (Launius and McCurdy ed. 1997).
When Kennedy asked him to come up with arguments for
space matters, Johnson turned to several individuals in
order to gather information on the options and possibilities
of a potential space program. Wernher von Braun, whom
Johnson had contacted in April 1961, assured him that the
Soviets would not have a rocket to send a crew to the
Moon. Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg on the other
hand disagreed with the premise that a Moon program
would stimulate the economy as was anticipated by
Kennedy.
Nonetheless, after having collected technical opinions,
Johnson—from 1961 onwards being the chairman of the
space council—began to persuade political leaders of the
need for an aggressive lunar landing program. He spoke
with several representatives to ascertain if they were willing
to support an accelerated space program. Whenever he
heard reservations, Johnson used his forceful personality to
persuade the Kennedy administration.
It was clearly Johnson, even at an early state, who
favored an expanded space program and a maximum effort
to land an astronaut on the Moon. Johnson insisted that
manned exploration of the Moon was essential whether or
not the United States turned out to be first. In his exercise,
Johnson had built, as Kennedy had wanted, a strong
justification for a presidential initiative to undertake Project
Apollo, but he had also moved further, toward a greater
consensus for the objective among key government and
business leaders. NASA’s leaders were enthusiastic about
the course Johnson recommended. James E. Webb (1906–
1992), NASA chief administrator from February 1961
through October 1968, with powerful connections to
Congress, made sure that NASA was supported fully and
on the long run, recommending that the national space plan
included the objective of manned lunar exploration within
the given decade. As is well known, on May 25, 1961
Kennedy hold a second State of the Union address asking
for the most open-ended commitment ever made in order to
land an American on the Moon. Was it as enthusiastically
though, as Launius (2004) writes that Congress appropri-
ated funding for Apollo?
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In 1963, dissenting views grew louder, taxpayers
complaining about the costs, scientists resenting the
slighting of more important project. The New York Times,
reflecting public opinion, proclaimed the lunar program to
be in crisis (The New York Times, July 13, 1963 issue). In
the fall of 1963 at the United Nations, Kennedy then made
a serious case that the Unites States and the Soviet Union
should explore the Moon together (see his Memorandum
for NASA Administration of November 12, 1963, in
Launius 2004).
Kennedy’s commitment to space nevertheless captured
the American imagination and attracted overwhelming
support. No high official at the time seemed deeply
concerned about either the difficulties or the expenses. It
was essentially due to Johnson’s effectiveness—first as vice
president, and after November 1963 as president—in
building a nation’s consensus for a space program credit
that this commitment developed. Observing some of the
most powerful people endorse the idea of a space program
made it easier for the rest to follow. Johnson increased
NASA’s spending by 150 million to over 4 billion USD, not
so much anymore in order to win the race for space, but to
develop the technology and the science of space in order to
be present. Johnson also believed that the Apollo mission
made excellent economic and political sense. Land a man
on the Moon would not only reaffirm America’s superiority,
so was Johnson’s saying, but would also spur both
immediate and long-term economic growth and gain the
administration considerable political credit with the public.
And in 1963, it was Johnson also who amplified the
appropriation for the space program, by pointing out that
the space program as expensive as it was, could be
“justified as a solid investment which will give ample
returns in security, prestige, knowledge, and material
benefits” (L. B. Johnson cited by Dallek, in Launius and
McCurdy ed. 1997: 73). It was of little use that economists
argued against it (in the Fortune issues of June 1962 and
November 1963 as well as in the Harvard Business Review,
November–December issue). Polls carried out in 1964
onward showed that he had made his point.
Likewise argued NASA’s chief Administrator Webb. He
kept close track of how NASA affected the nation’s
economy and took every opportunity to apprise Johnson
of this gain. In a 1965 report to the president, Webb pointed
out that, in the previous year, 94% of NASA’s investment
had gone to 20,000 private US industrial companies, 331
million had been spent in 120 cities in 22 states with high
unemployment rates, and as many as 750,000 people
worked directly or indirectly on NASA related business.
What’s more, he delineates that new materials, complex
electronics, mechanicals and chemical systems were devel-
oped, bringing with it revolutionary change in the way of
making and testing things, not only for space systems, but for
innumerable other non space services, processes and materi-
als. Webb was very enthusiastic, and eager in accomplishing
what Johnson had declared as a vision of a “Great Society”: “I
know of no area”, he told the president, “where the
inspirational thrust toward doing everything required of a
great society can be better provided on a proven base of
competence, and with so many practical additional benefits to
be derived, than through the space program.” (J. E.Webb cited
by Dallek, in Launius and McCurdy ed. 1997: 77–78).
Johnson’s inclination to be generous with NASA and
provide for a modest amount of post-Apollo spending could
withstand neither a disastrous fire in an Apollo command
module in January 1967 nor a growing US budget deficit
spurred by the fighting in Vietnam. The destruction of
Apollo 1 and the killing of the three astronauts undermined
further national confidence in NASA, which was for some
time accused of carelessness in trying to move project
Apollo forward too quickly. Senate hearings raised ques-
tions about a large number of defects in the spacecraft.
Webb’s decision for a straightforward policy in responding
to the failings that produced the fire restored a measure of
confidence in the agency and prompted the Senate
committee to recommend that NASA continue to move on
the Apollo program (Dallek in ibd.; Dick and Launius ed.
2006). Nevertheless—and/or as a consequence?—NASA’s
budget declined with fiscal year 1967 and did not even turn
around with the successful lunar landing. Webb brought
forward the cold war rhetoric to press for an increase of
NASA budget, however in vein; the rhetoric had lost its
power. In fact, as Hoff (in Launius and McCurdy ed. 1997)
has pointed out, the July and November Moon landings
probably diminished rather than contributed to furthering
public interest, and hence sustained the disillusionment felt
by many Americans about Project Apollo. While techno-
logically innovative and visually exciting, the program left
much to be desired from most other vantage points.
Richard Nixon (1913–1994), who assumed the presi-
dency in 1969 after Johnson, first showed an initial outburst
of enthusiasm by declaring the flight of Apollo 11 as the
representation of the “most significant week in the history
of Earth since the creation” (R. Nixon cited by Launius in
Dick and Launius ed. 2007: 36). Nixon eventually moved
space technology away from being a political and military
weapon in the cold war. In addition to severe economic
problems that Nixon had inherited from the massive
spending programs in Vietnam and the Great Society, it
seems that Nixon just never exhibited the personal
enthusiasm for an expansive commitment to the space
program that Johnson and Kennedy had shown. In fact, the
post Apollo era had already been restricted by Johnson,
who had only agreed upon funding for the Apollo program,
and never sincerely considered a post-Apollo era (Launius
and McCurdy ed. 1997).
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Subsequently, Nixon did not perceive the space program
to be in crisis as a result of lower funding, unlike other
domestic issues. Apparently, he revealed no particular
interest in the subject at all. He had mentioned the space
program more often during his 1960 presidential campaign
than he did in the 1968 campaign. Although he spoke of the
Apollo 11 accomplishment as the “most exiting event of the
first year of my presidency” (R. M. Nixon cited in Hoff, in
ibd.: 97), his presidential papers document clearly that his
personal interest was more in the diplomacy of space. After
the 1970’s, international competition lessened, and interna-
tional cooperation between the United States, Canada, and
the nations of Western Europe stepped forward. All these
factors indicate his basic agreement with a moderate level
of spending in this arena and his preoccupation with other
issues. Modest presidential enthusiasm resulted in little
attention overall for the space program.
This historical tale illustrates the now well-documented
observation (by Gladwell in The Tipping Point, 2002) that
the spread of an idea depends highly on the enthusiasm of a
few key individuals with the necessary power and influence
to pursue it, ready to take risks to push the plan forward and
adapt it in innovative ways to the context. Kennedy and
Johnson had to face serious political and economic issues
too. Yet they were enough attached to the idea to send a
man to the Moon that they stuck with the idea, and pursued
it sufficiently vigorously to involve other people to broaden
the support.
Funding for Apollo
The human spaceflight program was undertaken by NASA
from 1961 through 1975, Apollo spearheading NASA’s
overall program during the sixties. NASA was established in
1958 out of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA) in a act of reorganization as an answer to the political
pressure after the launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviets. NASA
started with a bulk of 8,000 employees and an annual budget
of roughly 100 Mio USD. Although the lunar landing
generally overshadowed other important activities, critics of
the agency often saw the near term goal as an end in itself,
while the program stimulated phenomenal progress in aero-
space technology. Building upon the pioneering achievements
of Mercury and Gemini, Apollo produced dramatic advances
in launch vehicles, spacecraft and operational techniques.
In 1961, Kennedy managed to sign in as much as 18
contractors. North American Aviation Inc., a major con-
tractor being responsible for the manufacturing of three
spacecrafts, signed a contract of 900 Million USD for the
period from August 1961 through November 1962. Others
did not get as much, however the contractors all together
obtained 1.5 billion USD over the same time period, ready
to be incorporated into the Apollo program (Ertel and
Morse 1969–1978). As 1962 drew to a close, NASA had
designed the most costly and challenging engineering
project in civil times. In February 1963, NASA signed a
contract with Boeing for about 419 Million Dollars to build
ten boosters. It has to be emphasized though that most
contractors kept other businesses on track in order not to be
too dependent on the space industry.
An overview of the funding during the fiscal years
1961–1969 highlights the importance of the Apollo project.
(Note that it is quite difficult to obtain budget figures and
facts on funding. Whereas the publications and research
reports on technical details of the Apollo project constitute
an enormous body of literature, only little has been
published on the financial aspects so far.) The Apollo share
of the total NASA Budget increased over the years between
1962 and 1970 from 10% (1962) to 70% in 1967 (all
figures are drawn from Ertel and Morse 1969–1978; see
Table 1). Financial support wasn’t a given thing, though,
but had to be negotiated on a yearly basis: “People
frequently refer to our program to reach the moon during
Table 1 Authors’ compilation,
based on the Final Budget
Appropriation for NASA and
the Apollo Project (in Million
Dollars) taken from Ertel and
Morse, 1969–1978 ; GDP data
(in Million Dollars) taken from
http://www.bea.gov/index.htm
[URL April 30, 2008]
FY NASA USD
current value
NASA USD
2006 value
Apollo USD
current value
Apollo USD
2006 value
GDP USD
current value
1961 964 5’280 − − 544’700
1962 1’672 9’034 160 865 585’600
1963 3’674 19’645 617 3’300 617’700
1964 3’975 20’934 2’273 11’970 663’600
1965 4’271 22’088 2’615 13’523 719’100
1966 4’512 22’688 2’967 14’922 787’800
1967 4’175 20’366 2’916 14’225 832’600
1968 3’971 18’576 2’556 11’958 910’000
1969 3’194 14’234 2’025 9’026 984’600
1970 3’114 13’181 1’686 7’137 1’038’500
1971 2’555 10’300 914 3’683 1’127’100
1972 2’508 9’689 601 2’323 1’238’300
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the 1960s as a national commitment,” Lyndon Johnson
wrote 1971 in his Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–69.
“It was not. There was no commitment on succeeding
Congresses to supply funds on a continuing basis. The
program had to be justified and money appropriated year
after year. This support was not always easy to obtain.”
Yet, the financial funding of NASA increased yearly
between 1961 and 1966, at which time it reached its peak.
Correspondingly, the share of the Apollo program also
increased with each year. In 1963, the final fiscal budget for
Apollo was still 0.62 billion USD or 17% of the entire
NASA budget. In 1964, it increased to 2.27 billion USD or
57% of the overall NASA budget, even though the aim of
putting men on the Moon was still far beyond reach. The
public complaining about the costs in 1963 obviously did
not put an end to the support by Congress; it merely led to a
momentary halt of the budget increase. The 2 years 1963
through 1964 saw the essential completion of the putting
together of the Apollo government-industry terms, a
substantial maturing of the design, the verification of many
essential design features by tests, and streamlining of the
flight program. In 1965, the total sum of 4.27 (and not 5.2
billion USD as is given in numerous summaries in the
literature) went to NASA, and thereof 2.61 billion USD to
the Apollo program. The funding reached its peak in 1966
with an overall NASA budget of 4.51 billion USD, whereof
2.97 billion USD or 67% went to the Apollo program.
An accident with Apollo 1 on January 27, 1967 (a fire in
the crew module, bringing three astronauts to death) was a
severe blow to NASA. The accident forced a temporary halt
to the program and the agency’s safety procedures underwent
extensive review, the budget for Apollo slightly decreasing
to 2.60 billion USD in 1968. Nevertheless, the first manned
flight was Apollo 7 in October 1968 and in 1969 two men
were put on the Moon. However, in the early 1970s, after a
few more manned flights, interest in furthering Moon
exploration waned. After the initial rise of efforts embodied
in the Apollo program, space exploration reached an
equilibrium, accompanied by drastic budget shortening; the
fiscal budget in 1971 was 0.91 billion USD for Apollo or
36% of the overall NASA budget, and in 1973 it was down
to a minuscule 3% fraction only.
The last Apollo mission landing astronauts on the Moon
was in 1972, when Apollo 17 concluded the Apollo
mission. After that the United States did not undertake
any other Moon flights. Further on, NASA concentrated its
efforts on the launch of reusable spacecrafts, i.e. the Space
Shuttle program, on Space Telescope projects and on the
International Space Station. As of 2008, there has not been
any further human spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit since
the last mission in the Apollo program. Concomitantly, the
scale of funding reached during the Apollo program has
never been seen again.
Human and Social Dimensions
As interesting as it would be to do so, it is out of the scope
of this paper to recount the whole story, which can anyway
be found in many sources cited in the bibliography. For the
purpose of testing the pro-bubble hypothesis, we are
interested in identifying situations in which people
exhibited a propensity to take large risks associated with
an initiative or for the development of a project. The Apollo
program was a culmination of the work of hundreds of
thousands of people. Most of them remain unidentified. We
thus have to focus only on a few exceptional characters,
narrating parts of their biographies that put in perspective
their enthusiasm for the space project. We will take into
account the high risks that the protagonists were ready to
accept. We claim that such projects were carried out with a
rising (collective) enthusiasm, and willingness for under-
taking such major risks both financially and personally.
This will lead us to a second subsection which describes the
dynamics of the public support for the Apollo program.
In the early years of the space program, expectations
were high, and so was the eagerness to be the first in space
as well as being in space at all. Not only politicians, but the
scientists and engineers themselves were more than
enthusiastic to invest everything to succeed. One of the
most important figures among the early NASA employees
was the German native Wernher von Braun (1912–1977)
(Cadbury, 2005; Becker, 2007; http://history.nasa.gov/
sputnik/braun.html [URL: April 30, 2008]). As a youth, he
became enamored with the possibilities of space exploration
by reading the science fiction novels of Jules Verne and of H.
G. Wells, and the science writings of Hermann Oberth (Die
Rakete zu den Planetenräumen [By Rocket to Space], 1923).
From his teenage years, von Braun had held a keen interest
in space flight, becoming involved in the German rocket
society, Verein für Raumschifffahrt, as early as 1929. As a
mean to further his desire to build large and capable rockets,
in 1932 he went to work for the German army to develop
ballistic missiles. Von Braun is well known as the leader of
what has been called the “rocket team”, which developed the
V-2 ballistic missile for the Nazis during World War II. The
V-2s were manufactured at a forced labor factory called
Mittelwerk. Scholars are still reassessing von Braun’s role in
these controversial activities.
The invention of the V-2 rocket by von Braun’s rocket
team, operating in a secret laboratory at Peenemünde on the
Baltic coast, was the immediate antecedent of those used in
space exploration programs in the United States. By the
beginning of 1945, von Braun began planning for the
postwar era. Before the Allied capture of the V-2 rocket
complex, von Braun engineered the surrender of 500 of his
top rocket scientists, along with plans and test vehicles, to
the Americans. For 15 years after World War II, von Braun
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would work with the United States army in the development
of ballistic missiles.
In 1960, his rocket development center transferred from
the army to the newly established NASA and received a
mandate to build the giant Saturn rockets. Accordingly, von
Braun became director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight
Center and the chief architect of the Saturn V launch
vehicle, the superbooster that would propel Americans to
the Moon. That’s where he wanted to be since 1945:
“We’ve got mighty little time to lose, for we know that the
Soviets are thinking along the same lines. If we do not
wish to see the control of space wrested from us, it’s time,
and high time, we acted.” (von Braun 1955, cited by
Cadbury 2005: 147). In 1959, official approval was given
for the Saturn project, which aimed to develop a booster
rocket with enough power to reach the Moon. Von Braun’s
fame, though, vanished after 1965, when there was
continued opposition to the mounting cost of the Apollo
program, the engineer becoming a target for popular
criticism, due to his money consuming efforts as well as
his past as a Nazi-Member, something he had drawn the
curtain over (Cadbury 2005).
Enthusiasm was soaring with other scientists and engi-
neers too. In the 1950’s already, in the Apollo forerunners
projects, people were eager to test their engineering develop-
ments. Since tests with small animals such as hamsters and
mice were not sufficient to answer all questions, self-
experimenting was thought of as a matter of course. In
order to test the impact of weightlessness on the human
body (something we know nowadays to be low-risk,
however not so at the time), self-experiments were a daily
common endeavor. For instance, Herbert D. Stallings
estimated that by April 1958, he had flown more than
4,000 zero-g trajectories and compiled about 37 h of
weightless and subgravity flight in order to prove its
harmlessness (http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4201/ch2-3.htm
[URL April 30, 2008]).
John P. Stapp (1910–1999) from the Aeromedical Field
Laboratory was a pioneer in studying the effects of
acceleration and deceleration forces on humans. When he
began his research in 1947, the common wisdom was that a
man would suffer fatal internal injuries at around 18 g.
Stapp shattered this barrier in the process of his progressive
work, experiencing more “peak” g-forces than any other
human. Stapp suffered from repeated and various injuries
including broken limbs, ribs, detached retinas, and miscel-
laneous traumas which eventually resulted in lifelong
lingering vision problems caused by permanently burst
blood vessels in his eyes. In 1953, he conducted a sequence
of self-testing where he was seated on a rocket sled without
and with helmet. He tested speeds of several hundred km/h.
When decelerating he endured a force of 40 g (see Fig. 1)
(Becker 2007).
Putting one’s own life at stake for space science was also
beyond discussion for Virgil Ivan Grissom (1926–1967).
Grissom was well aware of the risks involved in the
spacecrafts he was boarding, and he always felt that they
Fig. 1 (taken from Becker 2007: 28)
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were a calculated risk. Grissom was an Air Force pilot and
a NASA astronaut (http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/
grissom-vi.html [URL: April 30, 2008]). He was the second
American to fly in space. He had entered the Air Force
Institute of Technology to study aeronautical engineering,
and was pilot of the second American suborbital spaceflight
(Mercury Redstone 4). Following the splashdown of the
craft, the hatch, which had explosive bolts, blew off
prematurely, letting water into the capsule and into
Grissom’s suit. Grissom nearly drowned but was rescued,
while the spacecraft sank in deep water (Becker 2007). In
early 1964, Grissom was designated command pilot for the
first manned Project Gemini mission, making him the first
astronaut to return to space as well as the first person to fly
twice above the accepted boundary of space in a capsule-
based spacecraft.
When Grissom and fellow astronaut John Young walked
out in March 1965 to Gemini 3, the risks were much larger
than in previous flights. This was a new launch vehicle, a
new larger spacecraft and the first flight for humans in
“space.” In previous rockets, there was an escape tower. In
the new Gemini 3, the crew escape system had been
reduced, diminishing its capability. The new flight was a
big, risky step, perceived as such by the astronauts, while
the public was largely unaware of these new risks. A few
days before the launch of the Gemini 3 aircraft, Grissom
alarmed NASA administrator James Webb by saying: “If
we die, we want people to accept it. We’re in a risky
business, and we hope that if anything happens to us, it will
not delay the program. The conquest of space is worth the
risk of life.” (V. I. Grissom, March 1965). His career with
NASA confirms his statement as a testimony of the
foundation of his commitment. Grissom was made com-
mander of a Saturn Launch vehicle, intended to be the first
manned Apollo flight. On January 27, 1967, when running
through a series of tests for the Apollo 1 mission in a
simulated flight environment, he was killed together with
two fellow astronauts (Ertel and Morse 1969–1978). The
deaths of the three astronauts were attributed to a wide range
of lethal design hazards in the early Apollo command module
such as its highly pressurized 100% oxygen atmosphere
during the test, many wiring and plumbing flaws, flammable
materials in the cockpit, a hatch which might not open at all
in an emergency and even hazard from the flight suits worn
by the astronauts. An internal NASA enquiry resulted in the
spacecraft problems being fixed and successful resumption of
the Apollo program (http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/
grissom-vi.html [URL: April 30, 2008]).
Not least committed to space flight was John Herschel
Glenn (1921–), in his youth as well as in later years. He
was the third American to fly in space and the first
American to orbit the Earth in February 1962 (http://www11.
jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/glenn-j.html [URL: April 30,
2008]). After retiring from the Marine Corps on January
1, 1965, he was a business executive from 1965 until his
election to the United States Senate in November 1974
(retired 1999). Decades later, at the age of 77, Glenn lifted
off for a second space flight on October 29, 1998, on a
Space Shuttle. His intention was to study the effects of
space flight on the elderly people (Becker 2007). He
became the oldest person ever to go into space. Whereas
some criticized Glenn’s participation in the nine-day
mission as a junket for a politician, others noted that
Glenn’s flight offered valuable research on weightlessness
and other aspects of space flight on the same person at two
points in life.
Altogether, being part of space technology was much
more than participating in the space race. Many parties
involved expressed their decision to take part as a result of
their desire and passion. Building Apollo was more than
just the yearning to beat the Russians. It was the fulfillment
of a dream, be it a boy’s dream, a dream fueled by the
heaps of Science fiction narratives (Dick and Cowing ed.
2004) or even the vision to build a better society in space
(see the contributions in Dick and Launius ed. 2006). And
it did not free the impassionate participants until the dream
of the lunar landing was fulfilled. As Los Angeles Times
reporter Rudy Abramson has put it in 1969—just 3 days
before the Apollo 11 launch—: “The United States this
week will commit its national pride, 8 years of work and
$24 billion of its fortune to showing the world it can still
fulfill a dream.” (R. Abramson in the Los Angeles Times,
July 13, 1969).
After all, taking risks was not seen as putting one’s life
in danger, but getting the chance to explore things, to
experience space exploration. “My desire [to explore]
outweighed the risk I perceived, a risk greater than I
probably realized at the time”, said Michael Foale (cited in
Dick and Cowing ed. 2004: 262), an astronaut with NASA
in the 1980s. And since the astronauts felt that risk was
always with them, their interests were focused on the rewards
coming along with exploration rather than on risk—
corresponding to an upward biased perception of the
reward/risk ratio, typical of the bubble spirit we wish to
document. Some did it because they felt they wanted to
contribute to innovative science, others just for the sheer
curiosity. This was the case for Shannon Lucid, Space
Shuttle astronaut in the late 1970s: “[…] why I really
wanted to go was because I was curious. I was very curious
to find out what it would be like to live and work in space
for a long period of time, I was curious to see how the body
would adapt. And I really wanted to experience that.”
(S. Lucid cited in ibid.: 161). Risk was something not to be
ignored, but to be handled: “I took the perceived risk, or
took what I felt was a risk, and changed it into something I
thought I could handle. I changed it into a procedure. I
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forced the system into accommodating what I could handle.
And so that’s how I handled those risks.” (ibid.: 163). Risk
was not to be ignored, but to be aware of, and to be
reduced: “After the risk is past, crew members, family,
space managers, all of us are relieved, and we celebrate
how we have cheated death once more. It shows in our
faces that the risk of spaceflight and space exploration is
always present, and we must always be honest about it,
explain it, and do our utmost to reduce it, without hiding it.
[…] No, you talk about it.” (M. Foale cited in ibid.: 266;
see also Lovell ibid.). These quotes show not much of a
difference between the earlier protagonists, and their
followers. The risk had to be taken in any case, for the
sheer sake of space exploration. This was common wisdom
at the time: “The greatest risk is not to explore at all.”
(ibid.: passim).
The Public Response to Apollo
Launches from Cape Canaveral inevitably drew hundreds
of thousands of excited spectators; public support of the
space program in its early stage was enthusiastic. It was the
time when Congress decided that NASA, and not NASA
and the Air Force, would put a man on the Moon. During
the negotiations, John Glenn and Scott Carpenter had
orbited the Earth, and the American public was cheering
for its new space agency. In 1962, the high volume of sales
of space toys and kits in department stores after each launch
was proof of the public attraction to anything related to
space.
As early as 1963, however, criticism was beginning to
grow in the press. Whereas in 1962, the editors used
superlatives when talking of space exploration (e.g.
Fortune, June 1962), in 1963, enthusiasm was somewhat
low. The lavish amount of money being poured into NASA
was being questioned, should it go up constantly (Fortune,
June 1962; November 1963). A number of writers criticized
the program as a cynical mix of public relations and profit-
seeking, a massive drain of tax funds away from serious
domestic ills of the decade, a technological high card in
international tensions during the cold war era. The last
orbital flight had been in May 1963 and it looked very
ordinary compared to the Soviet double act. A series of
congressional hearing questioned the value of a lunar
program (Cadbury 2005). Among scientists, the initial
enchantment had faded before the mounting costs and they
feared the heavy drain on other fields of scientific endeavor.
Furthermore, less and less was heard of the military
urgency of exploring the Moon, even the Air Force decided
its interests would lie more in “inner-space” capability.
Payoffs of the Program seemed to vanish (Fortune,
November 1963). As a consequence, in July 1963, The
New York Times carried a headline proclaiming Lunar
Program In Crisis, echoing popular sentiments (The New
York Times, July 13, 1963). What has happened? The
impetus for this declaration was not only managerial
problems within NASA but foremost a study concluding
that the odds of reaching the Moon by the end of the decade
were only about one in ten and that a lunar landing could
not be attempted “with acceptable risk” until late 1971.
Others criticized the Apollo program for its timetable, for
being developed in the context of a race rather than as an
undertaking following a reasonable pace. The timetable
derived from the race called for bringing it to a culmination
in 1967 or 1968. However, this speedup increased the costs
tremendously (Fortune, November 1963). What’s more,
1964 was the year when astronauts expressed doubts on the
skills of scientists and engineers, maybe as an answer to the
reservations expressed by the scientists for potential gains
coming from manned space exploration.
All the same, the pendulum again swung towards the
space program. After this temporary drop of enthusiasm in
1963, polls in the spring and fall of 1964 showed 64–69%
of the public were favorably disposed to landing an
American on the Moon, with 78% saying the Apollo
program should be maintained at its current pace or speed
up. Arguments on both economic and technological levels
paid their tributes. Polls performed in summer 1965 showed
a new decrease to a certain extent, since a third of the
nation now favored cutting the space budget, while only
16% wanted to increase it. Over the next three and a half
years, support for cutting space spending went up to 40%,
with those preferring an increase dropping to 14%. At the
end of 1967, The New York Times reported that a poll
conducted in six American cities showed that five other
public issues held priority over efforts on outer space.
Residents of these cities preferred tackling air and water
pollution, poverty and others before spending additional
federal funds to space exploration. The following year
Newsweek echoed the Time’s findings, stating that the
United States space program was in decline.
At the same time, Congress was strongly disposed to
reduce NASA’s budget. A White House survey of congres-
sional leaders at the end of 1966 revealed pronounced
sentiment for keeping Apollo on track but, simultaneously,
for cutting NASA spending by skimping on post-Apollo
outlays. Space age “seemed truly to have arrived,” stated
astronaut Michael Collins that year. In this context, in
January 1967, Johnson requested a 5 billion USD NASA
budget for Fiscal Year 1968. It has already been stated,
however, that 1966 was the peak of funding for both NASA
and the Apollo program, and Johnson did not succeed as he
might have wished.
The efforts of 1966/67, however, paid their tributes: On
Christmas morning of 1968, the Americans were greeted by
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newspapers, radio and television reports with the momen-
tous news that the crew of Apollo 8 was on its way back to
Earth after becoming the first human beings to orbit the
Moon. For the United States space program, this endeavor
represented a major step toward achieving the national goal,
and gaining support with it. The news that three astronauts
had flown around the Moon sparked feelings of national
pride. This event stood in stark contrast to the previous
events of 1968 (the Vietnam war still going on, the
assassinations of M. L. King and R. Kennedy, among
others). The nation was becoming increasingly divided over
the issues escalating during this year. Apollo 8 provided an
uplifting end to all these negative events. One of the
telegrams the astronauts received from the public summa-
rizes well the general spirit associated with Apollo
8 mission: “You [i.e. the astronauts] saved 1968.” (Chaikin
in Dick and Launius ed. 2007: 54–55).
In particular, this event created a general new awareness
of the Earth, as representing “a grand oasis in the big
vastness of space”, as astronaut Lovell expressed it,
overheard by millions of people during a television
broadcast by the astronauts from lunar orbit. This made
Apollo 8 different from previous explorations. Many
observers have noted the coincidence between Apollo
8 and increase in environmental activism. The historical
impact of Apollo 8 was only equaled when Apollo 11 made
it to the Moon on July 19, 1969. An estimated 600 million
people—one fifth of the world’s population—witnessed it
on television and radio. Some observers designated the day
as a turning point in history. Scientific writer Robert
Heinlein who had penned the story for the 1950 film
Destination Moon named it the “[…] greatest event in all
the history of the human race up to this time.” (R. Heinlein
cited by Chaikin in Dick and Launius ed. 2007: 55).
After Apollo 11 had landed on the Moon, lunar scientists
as well as astronauts became highly optimistic about the
outcome of scientific research associated with orbiting
flights and exploration of the Moon. Astronauts had
demonstrated that men were able to function as explorers
in the lunar environment (Michael Collins, as an example).
They were viewed by the advocates for manned space flight
as ample justification for the enormous investment they
required. Hopes of the scientists for resolving major
questions about the origin and evolution of the Moon
reached a peak of optimism at the beginning of 1970.
The Aftermath
The international chariot race, however, ended when the
Eagle landed. With astonishing rapidity, the raison d’être of
the Apollo program had undergone a metamorphosis.
Overnight, it transformed into a scientific undertaking for
the highest intellectual purpose. By the spring of 1970, it
was obvious that the intellectual rationale for Apollo could
not justify the full program in the absence of enthusiastic
public support, and that was waning. In November 1969,
Apollo 12 astronauts achieved a second lunar landing and
made two Moonwalks. Once again, there were live pictures,
but the news coverage was showing signs of apathy. One
Tennessee resident was even quoted as naming the event an
“old hat” (Chaikin in Dick and Launius ed. 2007: 58). The
second landing on the Moon lacked of enthusiasm, the
public progressively more disenchanted with the space
program. The voice of Apollo’s critics—always there but
never very loud (see especially contemporary literature
from the 1960s)—thus began to swell in volume. It became
an amusement to ridicule the program in intellectual and
political circles; support began to wither. The national polls
in the summer of 1969 found that 53% of the country was
opposed to a manned mission to Mars. And a poll taken in
1973 showed that only foreign aid had less support than
space exploration (McQuaid in Dick and Launius ed.
2007). Failures of the Apollo 13 mission added fuel to the
fires of criticisms. Also within NASA, the administrators
sensed that subsequent missions could not afford any other
failure.
There were several factors that exacerbated the decline in
interest. The society was changing. Chaikin (in Dick and
Launius ed. 2007) stresses the fact that unlike science
fiction writers and their readers, most Americans had little
familiarity with space technology and although TV com-
mentators struggled to convey the nuts and bolts of space
exploration, arcane concepts like space rendezvous were,
literally and figuratively, over the viewer’s heads. In
addition, NASA tended to emphasize the technical elements
of the program rather than the human experiences that
would have been easier to understand. Lunar science
became increasingly the focus of astronauts as well as
mission planners. For non-scientists, geologic talk about the
Moon and the origin of Earth wasn’t easy to follow. The
cultural divide between scientists and the rest seemed to
grow. From a practical standpoint, only a handful of Earth
scientists was benefiting from Apollo to pursue research of
questionable social relevance at enormous expense, to the
deprivation not only of more immediate and pressing social
needs, but also of other “relevant” scientific goals. This
attitude spread through many sectors of American society
that had supported space research enthusiastically a few
years earlier, notably academia. Liberals equated the
funding of technological development and fundamental
scientific inquiry (except in the field of medical research) as
being indifferent to social welfare.
The same attitude was adopted by the military establish-
ment and its committees in Congress. A substantial portion
of the radio astronomy program in the United States that the
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Department of Defense had supported for years promptly
collapsed. The Apollo program, which was born during the
Democratic Administration of John F. Kennedy in 1960,
had virtually been disowned by the liberal wing of the
Democratic Party by 1970. And President Nixon’s inten-
tions—as we have seen above—were far from helping to
change this course. Even though the Apollo 17 astronauts
felt that the lunar expeditions were instilling confidence
among the American people (Dick and Cowing ed. 2004),
after Apollo 17, the United States did not undertake any
more lunar flights. Thomas Paine, successor of James Webb
as NASA Administrator, had to cancel missions 18, 19, and
20, in order to save money, and assuage the new President
(Bizony in Dick and Launius ed. 2006).
In the short term, Project Apollo was an American
triumph. In the long term, the costs, close to 25 billion USD
overall in 1960s dollars, were large and might have made a
difference in other programs or helped avoid the inflation
that fueled dissatisfaction during the Vietnam War. Further-
more, we now know that the reason for the Soviet Union
loss of the cold war was that it could not compete with
Western financial and corporate power. From the beginning,
the Soviets were behind in almost every kind of techno-
logically complicated armament. Actually, the Soviet Union
took its position in space out of weakness. It developed its
space program based on less advanced technology (but
more robust as shown by the exceptional robustness of its
MIR space stations and the use of its old technology
launchers by the United States and many other nations after
the end of the cold war). On the American side, the lack of
transparency of the USSR produced a series of efforts to
find out what the Soviets were doing. The Sputnik I launch
led directly to that of the first reconnaissance satellite by the
United States early in 1961, and in turn inspired the Soviet
to other space endeavors. The moves and countermoves did
not all fit together neatly, but the Soviet accomplishments
brought the Americans into a full-scale, open race for the
Moon. Although the Moon program contributed a great
deal to the United States, one could argue that the tens of
billions of dollars spent in the 1960s on what Kennedy
essentially thought of as World propaganda could have
been otherwise devoted to the United States domestic
economy or even defense, and that might have convinced
the Soviets more quickly of the fruitlessness of the tragic
conflict with the United States.
Lessons for Today
Today, more than three decades after the program ended,
Apollo remains a unique event in the history of space
exploration. It was one of the most exceptional and costly
projects ever undertaken by the United States, and thus
constitutes an excellent example of how bubbles function
from within. In the context of bubbles associated with
innovation ventures and the creation of new technology, the
Apollo Project demonstrated the large risks that have been
undertaken individually, politically and financially, leading
to a collective (individual, public and political) over-
enthusiasm, which played a very significant role in the
development and completion of the process as such. The
qualifier “over” emphasizes that the enthusiasm did not out-
live by much the first Moon landing, and a general positive
sentiment in favor of the Moon exploration started to fade
shortly after the first step on the Moon. The evidence
gathered here supports the view that the Apollo program
was a genuine bubble, in the sense of our general definition
expressed in section 1, with little long-term fundamental
support either from society or from a technical or scientific
viewpoint. As expected from our hypothesis on bubbles, it
led to innumerable technological innovations, and scientific
advances, but many of them at a cost documented to be
disproportionate compared with the returns. These returns
may turn out to be positive on the long run as many of its
fruits remain to be fully appreciated and exploited.
With the first landing on the Moon in 1969, it was the
general belief at the time that 30 years later at the transition
to the third Millennium, mankind would have established
permanent stations on the Moon and on Mars, with space
travel expected to become almost routine and open to
commercial exploitation for the public. With the hindsight
of 2008, it is easy to dismiss this view. Here, we stress
instead that this view exemplifies the bubble spirit which is
typical rather than exceptional. Enthusiasm was always
present to push for the endeavor, risk always a topic but
never an issue. Major risks have been accepted by
individuals, first of all by some of the pioneers (engineers,
astronauts). They did not shy away from taking all possible
types of risks, even at the costs of their own life or health.
Such high risk levels were accepted for “real reasons,” in
the sense summarized by today’s NASA administrator
Michael Griffin in his January 2007 talk on Space
Exploration: Real Reasons and Acceptable Reasons
(http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=23189
[April, 29, 2008]. Real reasons are intuitive and compelling,
but they are not logical, they are not the standard acceptable
logical reasons based on solid rational cost/benefit analysis.
Real reasons are the opposite; they include curiosity, quest
for the fulfillment of dreams, competitiveness (because
people want to leave a legacy), and challenge, for the sheer
reason that it’s there. Even during Apollo’s last years, the
launch team’s esprit de corps seemed to be of central
concern. It could in fact be seen as a personal commitment
of each member of the launch team.
Enthusiasm shown by the public and by the financially
responsible entity, the Congress, was on the other hand
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somewhat more complex. Commitment by the public was
swaying. It did not always stand with NASA in equal
measure, thus was not always agreeing on taking the risks
that went with investing in such a major endeavor. In the
early stage of Apollo, support was undivided, and the first
concerns arose in 1963. In 1964 though, enthusiasm and
support with the program were back (69% positive).
Arguments on both economical and technological levels
obviously paid their tributes, most likely due to the effort of
Johnson and Webb after 1963. The summer 1965 then
showed a certain decrease, since a third of the nation now
favored cutting the space budget (66% positive). Over the
next three and a half years, support for the space program
went down to 60% (60% positive), and it only increased for
a short time during the lunar landing in mid 1969.
At the same time, Congress acted somewhat differently.
Approved funding was rising until its peak in 1966. The
“upheaval” by the public in 1963 had no direct manifestation
in Congress, on the contrary, at the time it was strongly willing
to increase NASA’s budget. After 1966 though, support
slowly but steadily decreased until it was cut off almost
entirely under Nixon. Since Nixon was not interested in
pursuing the “Apollo idea”, it terminated in 1972. This ending
though did not come as surprising as it seemed at first sight,
since its decline loomed on the horizon some years before,
after 1965 from the public’s, after 1967 from Congress’ side.
We have called the Apollo program one of the most
exceptional and costly project ever undertaken by the
United States at peacetime. However, just as Apollo had
come out of nowhere, and held center stage for a decade, it
vanished from the public consciousness, as if it had never
happened. It thus was an exceptional niche, not having been
revisited to any significant degree ever since.
Finally, from the point of view of the pro-bubble
hypothesis, a key question concerns the identification of
the main outcomes of the program. In a nutshell, what were
and what are the returns resulting from the Apollo bubble?
As we all know, several successive programs followed
Apollo. After a six-year hiatus in America’s human
spaceflight missions, in April 1981, NASA achieved the
first flight of its reusable Space Shuttle. Buoyed by NASA’s
promise that the Shuttle would make spaceflight routine,
many people responded once more with high enthusiasm.
And in the first several years of the Shuttle missions, there
was plenty of action to excite space buffs: they could
witness spacewalking Shuttle astronauts repairing satellites
and flying through the void with self-propelled maneuver-
ing units. The fact though that the Shuttle never ventured
beyond low-Earth orbit was lost on those Americans for
whom spaceflight had become synonymous with going to
the Moon. As for the 21st century, NASA is now slowly
gearing up to resume exploration to the Moon. In January
2004, President G. W. Bush announced a new vision for
Space exploration, including the return to the Moon, and
eventually going to Mars. And if all goes according to plan,
astronauts will be back on the Moon no later than 2020
(Dick and Launius ed. 2006).
Space exploration is thus a robust manifestation of a
venture where technological innovations rely on enthusiasm
leading to risk taking on a collective level. Further efforts
should now include the questions of how such major
projects can increase social welfare. Is it possible that
nascent, emerging industries need “animal spirits” and over-
investment for innovation? Or is it more that bubbles serve
mainly to change the wealth dynamics of society, and through
this mechanism affect the investment process? Much more
work is needed in this concern to clarify these questions.
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